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Abstract:
In March 1938, when the eyes of the entire Europe were trained on the events in
Austria that culminated with the Anschluss, there was another conflict on the
European continent that bothered the Western powers, and not only. On March
17, 1938 the Polish minister at Tallinn handed to the Lithuanian minister in the
capital  of  Estonia  a  notification  through  which  Warsaw  asked  Lithuania  to
establish  immediate  diplomatic  relations  without  prior  conditions.  The  Polish
government  considered  this  the  only  way  to  solve the  problems  related  to  the
border between the two states without jeopardizing the peace. Lithuania had 48
hours  after  the  delivery  of  the  notification  to  accept  the  proposal  without  any
debate or negotiation. Its rejection would have given Warsaw the right to ensure
its objectives and interests by any means it deemed necessary. Great Britain and
France reacted cautiously to this new crisis, hoping for a peaceful solution, in
order to avoid the involvement of the League of Nations or the escalation of the
events towards an open conflict between the two states. In its turn, Romania, as
an  ally  of  Poland,  refrained  from  a  possible  involvement  or  condemnation  of
Warsaw’s actions, a fact for which the Polish diplomats expressed their gratitude.
But even if Lithuania conceded and the crisis died out, the Western countries, as
well  as  Romania,  had  certain  anxieties  raised  by  the  Polish-Lithuanian  crisis
which were to come true a year later. Poland’s actions in March 1938 had created
a precedent that other powers did not hesitate to follow and the country that, in
the end, would lose everything was Poland itself.
Rezumat:
În momentul în care în martie 1938 privirile întregii Europe erau aţintiţi asupra
evenimentelor din Austria care au culminat cu realizarea Anschlussului, a mai
existat un conflict pe continentul european care a nemulţumit puterile occidentale,
şi  nu  numai. La  17  martie  1938  ministrul  polonez  la  Tallinn  i-aînmânat
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omologului său lituanian o notă prin care Varşovia solicita Lituaniei stabilirea
imediată de relaţiile diplomatice fără nicio condiţie prealabilă. Guvernul polonez a
considerat aceasta singura cale de a rezolva problemele legate de frontiera dintre
cele două state fără a pune pacea în pericol. Lituania avea la dispoziţie numai 48
de ore de la transmiterea notei pentru a accepta propunerea fără nicio discuţie sau
negociere. Respingerea sa ar fi dat Varşoviei dreptul de a-şi asigura obiectivele şi
interesele  prin  orice  mijloace  pe  care  le  considera  necesare. Marea  Britanie  şi
Franţa au reacţionat cu prudenţă cu privire la această nouă criză, sperând într-o
soluţie  paşnică, în  scopul  de  a  evita  implicarea  Societăţii  Naţiunilor  sau
escaladarea evenimentelor în direcţia unui conflict deschis între cele două state. La
rândul  său,  România,  aliată  a  Poloniei, s-a  abţinut  de  la  orice  implicare  sau
condamnare a acţiunilor Varşoviei, poziţie pentru care diplomaţii polonezi şi-au
exprimat gratitudinea. Dar chiar dacă Lituania a cedat şi criza a încetat, ţările
occidentale, la fel ca şi România, au nutrit anumite nelinişti alimentate de criza
polonezo-lituaniană, care se vor adeveri un an mai târziu. Acţiunile Poloniei din
martie 1938 au creat un precedent pe care alte puteri nu vor ezita să-l urmeze, iar
ţara care, în final, va pierde totul va fi chiar Polonia.
Keywords: Poland,  Lithuania, ultimatum,  international  crisis,  Romania,
Western Europe
After a rapid succession of political events in 1935-1936, 1937 was a
relatively quiet year in Europe, with the rather isolated exception of the
Spanish civil war. But things were about to change completely a year later,
in 1938, which bore the mark, first of all, of two events that anticipated the
evolution of European politics towards a great conflict: the Anschluss and
the Sudeten crisis.
The Germans seemed prepared in the spring of 1938 to modify the
national borders as established by the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, after they
made certain of enlisting the support of Italy and the neutrality of Poland1,
on March 12, 1938, after a whole month of tensions and threats, the German
troops crossed the border with Austria almost immediately after Berlin had
addressed  Vienna  an  ultimatum2.  The  fact  that,  the  day  before,  Great
Britain  had  objected  in  most  categorical  terms  against  the  German
ultimatum and against the threat of using force if the requests made by
1  Emilian  Bold  and  Ioan  Ciupercă,  Europa  în  derivă  (1918-1940).  Din  istoria  relaţiilor
internaţionale  [Europe  Adrift  (1918-1940).  From  the  History  of  International  Relations] (Iaşi:
Demiurg Publishing House, 2001), 196.
2 Henry Kissinger, Diplomaţia [Diplomacy], Trans. Mircea Ştefancu and Radu Paraschivescu
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Berlin  were  not  satisfied  at  once,  had  no  effect3.  In  spite  of  having
generated  a  profound  concern  in  the  countries of  Eastern  and  Central
Europe, the German action in Austria determined nothing else but protests
and indignation in Great Britain, even if the final events of the Austrian
crisis and Berlin’s enforcement of the Anschluss took Europe by surprise4.
As for the rest, nothing had changed. The British government did not even
consider bringing into discussion the events in Austria before the League of
Nations, reasoning that such a gesture would be completely useless5. This
time the French agreed with the British. In their turn, they also thought that
to put into motion the bureaucratic apparatus of the League would have
been pointless6.
Coincidence or not7, during the crisis in Austria, there was another
conflict in Europe that bothered the Western powers. On March 17, 1938,
the  Polish  minister  at  Tallinn  handed  to  the  Lithuanian  minister  in  the
capital of Estonia a notification through which Warsaw asked Lithuania to
establish  immediate  diplomatic  relations  without  prior  conditions.  The
Polish  government  considered  this  the  only  way  to  solve  the  problems
related  to  the  border  between  the  two  states  without  jeopardizing  the
peace. Lithuania had 48 hours after the notification was delivered to accept
the proposal, and the mutual accreditation of diplomats had to take place
until March 31, 1938 at the latest. The Polish proposal was not open for
debate or negotiations and its rejection would have given Warsaw the right
to ensure its objectives and interests by any means it deemed necessary8.
Moreover, the Poles asked the Lithuanian government to open a railroad
immediately and to resume the postal relations between the two countries,
to reach a mutual understanding regarding the issues related to minorities,
to  sign  a  trade  and  customs  agreement,  to  revoke  the  articles  in  the
3  E.L.  Woodward  and  Rohan  Butler,  eds.,  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy  1919-1939
(hereinafter, D.B.F.P.), Third Series, vol. I, 1938 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office,
1949), doc. no. 39, 18-19.
4 Bentley B. Gilbert, Britain Since 1918 (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row Publishers,
1967), 107.
5 D.B.F.P., Third Series, vol. I, 1938, doc. no. 57, 32.
6 Ibid., doc. no. 72, 41-42.
7 See Anthony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939. The Crisis of Constitutional
Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 475.
8 Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt and Michael Partridge, general eds., British Documents
on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereinafter,
B.D.F.A.), Part II: From the First to the Second World War, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939, vol. 66,
Scandinavia  and  Baltic  States,  January  1938 –  December  1938 (University  Publications  of
America, 1996), doc. no. 32, 33.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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Lithuanian Constitution that named Vilna [today Vilnius] the capital of the
country and to urgently settle all border-related disputes9.
Apparently, the Polish ultimatum was the result of a controversial
incident that took place at the Polish-Lithuanian border, somewhere near
Transninkai,  on  the  morning  of  March  11,  when the  Lithuanian  border
police shot a Polish guardian. In general, this type of incidents was solved
within meetings between the local authorities. Such meetings took place
with this occasion as well, the commander of the Polish troops in the region
admitting to the fact that the unfortunate soldier who lost his life crossed,
by  mistake,  the  border  between  the  two  states10.  Even  under  these
circumstances, the Lithuanian authorities asked Warsaw to further discuss
the matter in order to find alternatives and procedures that, in the future,
would prevent other such incidents happening11. As for the Polish party,
the  authorities  in  Warsaw  apparently  reacted  disproportionately,  giving
the  incident  in  Transninkai  the significance  of  a  challenge  presented  by
Lithuania12. Such a challenge could not be ignored, the direct consequence
being  the  Polish  ultimatum.  The  explanations  of  this  gesture  in
historiography  are diverse,  but  the  most  plausible  seems  to  be  that  the
Polish  government  tried  to  strengthen  its  position  in  front  of  Germany,
which was more and more aggressive in its foreign policy, as Berlin also
benefited from the “understanding” of the conciliatory Western powers13.
Moreover, in its turn, the vicinity with the Soviet Union made the Polish
leaders choose a certain expansionary policy and create influence areas to
counterbalance, as much as possible, the eventual German and/or Soviet
danger14.
Faced with Warsaw’s ultimatum, the Lithuanians hesitated at first.
Through  their  minister  in  Paris,  they  tried  to  contact  the  Polish
9 Ibid., doc. no. 34, 35. These additional requests were included in an annex to the Polish
ultimatum. See the complete text in Robert A. Vitas, „The Polish Ultimatum to Lithuania.
The  Dispatch  of  Lithuanian  Minister  J.  Baltrušaitis  in  Moscow”, Lituanus.  Lithuanian
Quarterly  Journal  of  Arts  and  Sciences  31,  No.  4  (Winter  1985),  note  no.  23,
http://www.lituanus.org/1985/85_4_02.htm (April 12, 2010).
10  Robert  A.  Vitas,  „The  Polish-Lithuanian  Crisis  of  1938.  Events  Surrounding  the
Ultimatum”, Lituanus. Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences 30, No. 2 (Summer
1984), http://www.lituanus.org/1984_2/84_2_03.htm (April 10, 2010).
11 Z. Wierzbowski, „La Pologne recouvre son independence (1914-1939)”, in Pologne 1919-
1939. Vol. I., Vie politique et sociale (Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1946), 144.
12 Vitas 1984.
13 Ibid.
14 Nicolae Dascălu, Relaţii româno-poloneze în perioada interbelică (1919-1939) [Romanian-Polish
Relations in the Interbellum Period] (Bucharest: Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1991),
67.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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government, proposing bilateral negotiations in a third country. Moreover,
the Lithuanian diplomacy attempted to capitalize on the goodwill of the
British government in order to determine the Polish to accept the offer and,
in their turn, they asked for London’s advice on using the mechanisms of
the League of Nations to settle the differences with Poland15. The British
regarded  favourably to the  Lithuanian  offer,  thinking  that  such  an
approach would lead to a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the dispute.
As  for  the  League’s  help,  London  thought  that  it  would  have  been
inefficient, because no action of the Assembly in Geneva could have taken
place within the period mentioned in the Polish ultimatum16.
Actually, the British regarded with moderate optimism the end of the
Polish-Lithuanian crisis, thinking that Lithuania had nothing to gain if it
continued to interrupt de diplomatic relation with Poland, while accepting
the  Polish  ultimatum  would  not  have  meant  sacrificing  any  national
interest. The lack of diplomatic relations and the continuous tensions could
cause nothing but political frictions and poverty in the border districts, on
both sides of the border. Moreover, even if the method chosen by Warsaw
was not  the  most  adequate,  the Polish  government wrote  its  ultimatum
requests  in  a  rather  moderate  manner,  so  that  they  would  not  affect
Lithuania’s independence, and the Polish media was asked to refrain from
any comment that would disgrace Lithuania17.
In  this  context,  the  Lithuanian  authorities  decided  to  accept  and
satisfy Warsaw’s demands, a fact regarded with quite a relief in London
and Paris. However, there were also a few concerns. The Polish ultimatum
and threats could very well constitute a dangerous precedent in the Baltic
area. In the future, Germany could very well apply the same method to
regain control over the port Memel. In this case, it was preferable, the more
so, that the relations of the three Baltic states with Poland be as close as
possible. The improvement of the Polish-Lithuanian relations would have
been, from this point of view, extremely valuable, because it could support
the British peace-making policy in Eastern Europe, as well as Warsaw’s
plans to build a new “cordon sanitaire” between Germany and the Soviet
Union18.
Conversely, precisely the transformation of the Polish ultimatum into
a precedent favourable to Germany or other great powers with interests in
15 B.D.F.A., Part II, Series F, vol. 66, doc. no. 31, 32.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, doc. no. 34, 36.
18 Ibid., doc. no. 42, 47.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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the region raised the concern of the public opinion in Romania as well19.
Allied with Poland since 1921, Romania presented a dynamics of bilateral
relations  that  experienced,  during  the  interwar  period,  an  ascending
tendency, with the exception of some colder phases between 1933 and 1936
caused by the concerns and suspicions raised by the closer relation between
Poland  and  Hungary,  as  well  as  by  the  fact  that  Poland  maintained  a
prestige policy, meant to place it at the level of the great powers and to give
it a certain tutelage over the foreign orientation of other countries, Romania
included20.  Thus,  Bucharest  appeared  to  be,  at  least  officially,  extremely
cautious as regards the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania.
Obviously, there are plenty of explanations for this attitude adopted
by  the  Romanian  authorities.  The  alliance  with  Poland  was  extremely
important in the strained political context in Europe, and in particular in
Eastern  and  Central  Europe,  especially  since  the  political  leadership  in
Warsaw often underlined the fact that Poland’s borders with Germany and
Romania were deemed to be final21. Furthermore, this attitude is accounted
for by the lack of reaction from the Western powers, as well as by the fact
that  the Anschluss  outshone,  through  its  significance,  amplitude  and
possible consequences appeared  to  be  a mere  settlement  of the  bilateral
relations between two neighbouring countries, even if the method chosen
by Warsaw to get such a settlement was debatable.
Thus,  Bucharest’s  attitude  regarding  the Polish-Lithuanian  crisis  in
March  1938  or,  more  precisely,  the  lack  of  a  definite  attitude,  is  not
arbitrary. Even the media in Bucharest presented the events rather tersely
and  concisely,  at  least  in  the  beginning.  Within  the  context  of  the
publication  of  the  Polish  ultimatum,  we  were  unable  to  identify  in
important  Romanian  newspapers  of  that  period  but  short  accounts
regarding the evolution of the dispute. Very few editorials or ample articles
are to be found, obviously predominated, even so, by reports on the Polish
position and less about the reaction or the point of view of the authorities
in Kaunas22.
In this context, the only visible concern appearing through the lines of
press releases was the escalation of the crisis and the outbreak of an open
armed conflict. In such circumstances, a possible involvement of the Soviet
19 The fact is clearly emphasized in the Romanian media of that period. See, for example, the
article Relaţiile dintre Polonia şi Lituania inspiră îngrijorări [The Relations between Poland and
Lithuania Raise Concerns], in the newspaper Universul 55, no. 75, March 17, 1938, 15.
20 Dascălu, 66.
21 Ibid., 67.
22 We focused, first of all, on the accounts in the newspaper Universul, but the situation was
also identical in the case of other important newspapers of the period.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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Union, which  was  rumoured  to  be ready  to  guarantee  the  borders  of
Lithuania,  as  well  as  a  possible  reaction  of  Germany,  that  could  take
advantage  of  the  situation  to  support  the  ultimatum  demands  made  by
Warsaw, and, then, to occupy the port Memel and its surrounding area
under the pretence of protecting the German minority in that area, were
scenarios considered by the Romanian public opinion23.
Such  scenarios  seemed  the  more  plausible  as  the  political  tensions
between  Warsaw  and  Kaunas  were  doubled  by  a  quite  consistent
mobilization of the Polish troops at the border with Lithuania. The media
in  Bucharest  even  put  forward  the  number  of  60,000  Polish  soldiers  as
being  mobilized  at  the  border  and  ready  to  intervene  forcefully  in  case
Lithuania refused to satisfy Warsaw’s demands. Their task according to
these reports was to occupy the capital Kaunas as soon as possible and to
retreat  only  when  all  the  Polish  demands  would  have  been  satisfied24.
Moreover, the state of alert of the Polish army was supplemented by many
demonstrations  that  took  place  all  over  Poland  under  the  quasi-official
slogan “Commander, take us to Kowno!”25 The realistic possibility of such
a Polish intervention in force determined Romanian journalists to speculate
about the existence of an agreement between Poland and Germany so that,
together, the two countries could obtain certain territorial conquests at the
expense  of  Lithuania. This  would  lead  to  the  settlement  of  their  own
bilateral  disputes,  that  is,  Poland  would  have  agreed  to  renounce  the
Corridor and Danzig, getting, in exchange, a new corridor towards the sea
through Lithuania and the port Memel26.
The relaxation of the tension caused by the crisis and the possibility
that the authorities in Kaunas might satisfy the Polish demands led to a
further decrease in the interest, low as it was, shown by the public opinion
in Bucharest as regards the settlement of the contentious matters between
Poland and Lithuania. Practically, it was thought that, by settling this crisis,
“Warsaw and Kovno would have one more diplomat and Europe one less
concern”, though Poland did not stand to gain all that much as a matter of
prestige or position, while Lithuania lost what it did not have through this
forced settlement of bilateral relations. On the other hand, in Romania it
was thought that an actual improvement of the relations between Poland
23 Universul, no. 77, March 19, 1938, 13.
24 Ibid., no. 78, March 20, 1938, 12.
25  Ion  Constantin, Polonia  în  secolul  totalitarismelor  1918-1989  [Poland  in  the  Century  of
Totalitarianisms 1918-1989] ( Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului,
2007), 168.
26 „Conflictul dintre Polonia şi Lituania” [The Conflict between Poland and Lithuania],
Universul, no. 79, March 21, 1938, 1.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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and  Lithuania  could  lead  only  to  a  consolidation  of  the  position  of  the
Baltic countries and to an expansion of Warsaw’s influence in the region,
with  positive  effects  on  the  political  stability  of  the  region,  within  an
agitated and tensed European context27.
Finally,  Bucharest’s  distant  and  reserved  attitude  regarding  the
Polish-Lithuanian  crisis  of  March  1938  was  not  overlooked  or  left
unanswered  by  Warsaw.  The  Polish  political  leaders  transmitted  to
Romania their gratitude for the attitude adopted and for the fact that the
Romanian diplomacy understood the reasons for the Polish actions, as it
did not show any opposition against them28.
Even so, the warning Warsaw received from the Western diplomacies
– primarily the British one – which I could also identify in the Romanian
public  opinion,  according  to  which  the  Polish  ultimatum  represented  a
precedent that Berlin could use in the future to expand its influence in the
Baltic area to the obvious detriment of Poland, would remain valid and
would  come  true  a  year  later.  On  March  22,  1939  Lithuania  signed  an
agreement with Germany meant to “strengthen” the relations between the
two countries. Through this agreement, the Lithuanian government agreed
to  relinquish  to  Germany  the  sovereignty over  the  port  city  of  Memel,
practically an area of approximately 1,000 square miles, with a population
of almost 154,000 people. Thus, Lithuania lost its only access to the sea,
even if the German authorities agreed to guarantee a free zone in the port
area. Moreover, no possible German compensation was provided for the
huge investments made by Lithuania to modernize the port infrastructure
and facilities in Memel. Even in these circumstances and despite the fact
that the agreement was signed “half voluntarily, half involuntarily”, the
Lithuanian  government  declared  that,  generally  speaking,  they  were
pleased to sign this document with Germany29.
In this context, in spite of having received assurances on March 31,
1939 from Great Britain and France, Poland was going to be in an extremely
unfavourable  position.  After  the  fall  of  Czechoslovakia  and  the  new
Anschluss  through  which  the  port  Memel  was  regained,  Germany
controlled important territories at the northern and the southern borders of
27 Ibid.
28  See Florin  Anghel,  Nicolae  Mareş  and  Dumitru  Preda,  eds., România-Polonia.  Relaţii
diplomatice,  I, 1918-1939  [Romania-Poland.  Diplomatic  Relations,  I,  1918-1939],  Ministerul
Afacerilor  Externe,  Direcţia  Arhivelor  Diplomatice,  Foreword  by  Mircea  Dan  Geoană,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania (Bucureşti: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2003), doc.
no. 93, 192.
29 Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy toward the Baltic States 1918-1940 (Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1959), 100.The Polish-Lithuanian Crisis of March 1938. Some Romanian and Western Reactions
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Poland.  The  irony  of  history  is  that  Poland  was  the  one  to  contribute,
through its action in 1938 to the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state, as
well as to the weakening of the position of the Baltic States, especially that
of Lithuania.
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